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Abstract While the determinants of bank profitability have been well-explored, the
influence of institutions on bank performance is less understood, especially in the
transition context. Given the presence of a financial crisis such as the one that struck
the global economy from 2007 onward, did the underlying institutional structure of a
country help to mitigate the effects of the crisis on banks? Utilizing a new database of
1600 banks across 30 transition economies, this paper applies Bayesian model aver-
aging, fixed-effects, and IV-GMMmethodology to test the effect of institutions on bank
profitability in a crisis period. Results are conclusive across models that investor-
specific property rights aided bank profitability during the crisis. The effect of democ-
racy on banks is much more ambiguous but appears to negatively influence profitability
indirectly through interest group channels and bank concentration. These results hold
across a variety of specifications and robustness tests.
Keywords Institutions . Bank profitability . Return on assets . Transition economies .
Bayesianmodel averaging
JEL Classification G21 . P26 . E58
1 Introduction
The question of the drivers of bank profitability is a well-studied one in economics and
finance, with papers from Bourke (1989) to Flamini et al. (2009) approaching the
analysis from a panel perspective. From this vast literature, a consensus has formed on
broadly the most important factors regarding bank profitability, focusing on bank- or
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industry-specific factors, or the broader macroeconomic conditions prevailing in a
country.
Arrayed against this literature is a relatively more recent foray by some authors into
researching country-level institutional factors that may drive bank profitability. Papers
such as Beck and Levine (2005), Akitoby and Stratmann (2010), and Beltratti and Stulz
(2012) argue for the powerful influence of various institutions on the path of financial
sector development, as well as affecting the outcomes generated by financial institu-
tions. This research on institutions and profitability has thus far concentrated on either
single countries (such as Athanasoglou et al. (2008) on Greece and Dietrich and
Wanzenried (2011) on Switzerland) or on widely dispersed and heterogeneous samples,
as with Demirgüç-Kunt et al. (2004), who examine banks from 72 countries over the
period from 1995 to 1999.
However, the impact of institutions on profitability may be different in a particular
set of countries vis a vis another group. For example, in developed countries such as the
US or Singapore, the institutional environment may be less important for banking
performance, mainly due to the fact that the institutions in these countries are very
stable (one of the traits comprising an Binstitution^ being this notion of semi-perma-
nence). But what of other countries, where the institutional framework is either
incipient or in a state of flux? What if the institutional framework is merely two
decades old and still has not attained levels seen in Canada or Australia?
This scenario is precisely the case in the transition countries of Central and Eastern
Europe (CEE) and the former Soviet Union (FSU), which have put in place broader
market frameworks in a comparatively shorter period of time. Even given their
heterogeneous nature after 25 years of transition, these countries continue to share
the experience of recent systemic reform in both the broader economy and specifically
in reference to financial sector institutions (Hartwell 2013). Bank reform itself was part
of the institutional transition, and a significant factor in driving individual bank
profitability in the years following macroeconomic stabilization (Brissimis et al.
2008). But beyond bank-specific reforms, did the broader institutional environment
in transition have a larger impact than in the OECD countries on bank profitability?
How did progress in systemic institutional change, the core of transition, translate into
bank performance?
This question is particularly salient given the recent global financial crisis,
which was mostly grown in developed countries and then imported into emerg-
ing markets (including transition economies) via trade and financial sector
channels. It is possible that institutional development was even more crucial to
the performance of bank profitability in transition economies during the crisis,
explaining the differential effects of the crisis on bank profitability across the
transition space (Figs. 1, 2, 3, and 4). Indeed, there was considerable variation
across banks in transition, with Polish banks showing higher levels of profitabil-
ity than their Czech counterparts even in the crisis years. In the Balkans,
Bulgaria’s banks never recovered from the crisis, as evidenced by their latest
banking crisis in September 2014, while further east, Ukrainian banks, never
very profitable in the aggregate, were also badly hit by the financial crisis. Given
these different trajectories, the hypothesis that transition economies that had
moved much further in broader institutional reforms would have more profitable
banks, even during the crisis, seems eminently plausible.
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The purpose of this paper is to test this hypothesis and to examine the performance
of banks in transition during the global financial crisis and immediately thereafter. I
argue that bank performance can be understood as a function of a country’s underlying
institutional structure, which may have been crucial in helping banks in transition
weather the deluge; in particular, I examine whether and how contracting institutions
(property rights) and political representation (democratic accountability) impacted bank
profitability in transition during this time. The results presented below find, in contrast
to Beltratti and Stulz’s (2012) findings, that investor-specific property rights were
important for all countries, but were most significant for bank profitability during the
crisis. Additionally, greater levels of democracy appear to be correlated with lower
bank profitability, an effect that is related to the ability of interest groups to influence
the pace of reform.
This paper makes a novel contribution to the literature in three ways: first, this paper
applies proven methodologies specifically to the transition countries of Central and
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Fig. 2 Average bank profitability in Poland, 2006–2012
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study examining bank profitability in transition after a major crisis, a fact that helps
differentiate it from such papers as Fang et al. (2014), which focuses on bank risk up to
the crisis (1997–2008).1 Secondly, the frontier of knowledge on institutions, and in
particular in quantitative institutional economics, has been pushed outward in recent
years (see Hartwell 2013), meaning that we have much more accurate (or at least
complete) ways to quantify institutional development. This paper makes use of these
innovative indicators in a manner heretofore unexplored in the literature. Finally, earlier
studies on bank profitability have failed to incorporate model uncertainty into their
analysis, an issue given the possibly large set of variables that can influence banking
performance. This paper is the first to my knowledge to utilize Bayesian methods to
discern a Bcorrect^ model of bank profitability in transition during a crisis.
The paper is organized as follows: the next section provides an overview of the
theoretical basis for institution affecting bank profitability in transition, as well as an
overview of some of the previous literature in this area. Section III outlines the data and
empirical strategy for testing these relationships, while Section IV examines the results
and performs a large number of robustness tests to check the validity of these outcomes.
Section V concludes with some policy implications for banks and policymakers.
2 Bank Profitability in Transition: The Role of Institutions
There are many reasons, especially in a transition economy, why bank profitability may
be influenced in a crisis by the broader institutional environment. In the first instance,
there is of course the large background literature relating good institutions positively to
financial sector development (Demirgüç-Kunt and Levine 1996; Claessens and Laeven
2003), in that good institutions help support the growth of the financial sector more
broadly. There also already exists a wealth of research on institutional development in
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Fig. 3 Average bank profitability in Bulgaria, 2006–2012
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transition, with work such as Brunetti et al. (1997), Havrylyshyn and van Rooden
(2003), and Hartwell (2013) taking a methodical look at the various institutions needed
for a market economy and how they impacted different parts of the real economy in
transition. Linking these two strands of research together is the diverse body of work on
how institutions would influence financial outcomes: in addition to Demirgüç-Kunt
et al. (2004) and Athanasoglou et al. (2008), very recent work from Fang et al. (2014)
has already found some evidence of the impact of institutions on bank stability in
transition. Given this empirical backing, it is plausible to expect that these same
institutional changes may have benefitted the banking sector writ large and individual
banks in particular.
On a theoretical level in relation to bank profitability, one could expect property
rights to make contracting more secure and provide at least a legal basis for trust; thus,
even in the midst of a financial crisis, security of property rights should help banks to
weather the storm better than if there were worries about expropriation or nationaliza-
tion. This fact would be especially true in a transition economy, where the experience of
dealing with capitalist financial intermediation is far lower than in established Western
countries. Moreover, secure property rights tend to correlate with less governmental
interference, meaning that banks can minimize costs (and, by extension, raise profit-
ability) associated with policy uncertainty. There is some empirical support for this
theory, as Demirgüç-Kunt et al. (2004) found that positive institutional indicators are
associated with lower cost of financial intermediation for each particular bank.
On the other hand, a theory advanced by Diamond and Rajan (2001) posits that bank
deposits are an attractive alternative to formal property rights, especially in an envi-
ronment where investors are not well-protected. Under this formulation, banks act as an
ersatz contracting institution when broader legal and/or personal protections are weak.
However, this implies that private banks could actually do better in a weak-contracting
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Fig. 4 Average bank profitability in Ukraine, 2006–2012
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larger share of the financial intermediation market (there is also empirical evidence that
banks perform better in such an environment due to opportunities revealed via corrup-
tion, see Aburime 2009). If we accept this argument, it is plausible that broader
property rights may actually harm bank profitability, by allowing alternatives to
bank-based financial intermediation, and making margins smaller. In a crisis situation,
especially one where banks were the epicenter for the crisis, better property rights may
allow a flight away from banks and a concomitant drop in bank profitability.
Similarly, political institutions may also affect bank profitability in uncertain ways.
In theory, a more democratic polity may make better economic choices than a dictator
acting alone (Rodrik and Warcziag 2005), thus positively influencing the broader
environment that a bank operates in. Based on an analysis of emerging economies,
Rodríguez and Santiso (2008) find that banks do indeed prefer, based on their lending
patterns, stable emergent democracies (although their analysis neglects the issue of
bank profitability). On the other hand, democracies, especially in the throes of a crisis,
are prone to fits of populism and bad economics (Przeworski and Limongi 1993),
perhaps creating a popular desire for bailouts to save banks in particular (although
Rosas (2006) found the opposite, in that democratic regimes tend to rely on bank
closures more on average than bank bailouts). In direct relation to bank profitability,
populism could also go the other way, as public clamors for additional regulation and
policies could directly strike at the bottom line for any one particular bank. In a related
vein, the public could not necessarily advocate directly for harsher bank regulations,
but instead elect leaders of a certain political stripe (i.e. left-wing) that are more likely to
be less friendly to banks.
3 Empirical Strategy
3.1 The Data and Empirical Model
The data for this exercise comes from a newly assembled database of banks in
transition economies from 2006–2012 derived from various sources. Bank-level data
for the most part were derived from the BankScope database, but the most labor-
intensive portion of the database, the coding on foreign or domestic ownership, came
from scrupulous examination of publicly available sources, bank websites, and bank
regulatory filings. In total, 1963 banks from 30 transition countries over the timespan
2006–2012 are included in this dataset, although not every bank has a complete 5-year
series (Table 1 shows the countries included and the number of banks from each
country). Moreover, not every variable is available for each country in each year,
meaning a shifting window that translates in practice to approximately 7000 to 9000
observations (see Table 2 for descriptive statistics of the complete database).
The baseline empirical model, as is common in the literature (and similar to Dietrich
and Wanzenried 2011), will express bank profitability as a function of bank-specific,
industry-specific, and country-specific macroeconomic factors. Additionally, coming to
the crux of the research question of this paper, institutional factors are added as
additional country-specific explanators. The model is thus an examination to determine
which factors were more salient in the profitability of banks during and after the global
financial crisis. Was it the macroeconomic policies of the governments in the transition
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economies, or was it the institutional make-up of the country? Expressed as an
equation, the model is:
ROAit ¼ αBankit þ βIndustryit þ γPolicyit þ δInstitutionsit þ εit ð1Þ
Where ROA is average return on assets, the preferred (as in, inter alia,
Athanasoglou et al. 2008 and Dietrich and Wanzenried 2011) bank profitability
indicator. The positive attributes of ROA as an indicator of profitability have been
amply discussed elsewhere (see Golin 2001), but suffice it to say here that ROA is
preferred to ROE as ROE disregards risks associated with high leverage (financial
Table 1 Banks by country in the dataset
Country Number of banks Percent of total Cumulative
Albania 112 0.86 0.86
Armenia 154 1.18 2.04
Azerbaijan 217 1.67 3.71
Belarus 182 1.4 5.1
Bosnia and Herzegovina 210 1.61 6.72
Bulgaria 224 1.72 8.44
Croatia 259 1.99 10.42
Czech Republic 301 2.31 12.74
Estonia 77 0.59 13.33
Georgia 105 0.81 14.13
Hungary 308 2.36 16.5
Kazakhstan 294 2.26 18.75
Kosovo 49 0.38 19.13
Kyrgyzstan 98 0.75 19.88
Latvia 154 1.18 21.06
Lithuania 77 0.59 21.66
Macedonia (FYROM) 126 0.97 22.62
Mongolia 84 0.64 23.27
Montenegro 70 0.54 23.8
Poland 434 3.33 27.14
Republic of Moldova 112 0.86 28
Romania 259 1.99 29.98
Russian Federation 7077 54.33 84.31
Serbia 224 1.72 86.03
Slovakia 161 1.24 87.26
Slovenia 182 1.4 88.66
Tajikistan 56 0.43 89.09
Turkmenistan 7 0.05 89.15
Ukraine 1281 9.83 98.98
Uzbekistan 133 1.02 100
Total 13,027
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leverage ratios can also be endogenously determined by regulation). As a robustness
check, however, ROE will also be included as a possible indicator of bank profitability,
keeping in mind the caveat associated with bank debt.
In relation to the bank-, industry-, and country-specific indicators, a large number of
possible determinants of profitability have been identified in the literature; given this
embarrassment of riches, a rigorous econometric method (detailed below) will be
utilized in order to pare down variables and obtain the Bcorrect^ model. Bank-
specific attributes are not chosen randomly for, as noted above, there is a large literature
on the bank-specific drivers of bank profitability. For example, Molyneux and
Thornton (1992) find that bank concentration is a positive explanator of bank profit-
ability, while Goddard et al. (2004) find that bank size is negatively correlated with
profitability in European banks. Dietrich and Wanzenried (2011) extend this analysis to
Table 2 Descriptive statistics
Variable n Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Bank specific
ROA 9901 1.25 5.16 −241.48 98.21
ROE 9892 7.73 29.89 −663.78 900.00
Size 9895 10.64 2.03 −3.22 17.89
Operating costs 9849 77.88 35.14 0.31 921.21
Foreign ownership 13,027 0.28 0.45 0.00 1.00
Credit risk 9817 54.27 20.58 −1.03 99.80
Capital adequacy 9907 20.40 17.77 −446.21 100.00
Industry-specific
Domestic credit 12,766 46.12 13.98 7.23 106.35
Bank concentration 11,118 45.08 22.70 22.17 100.00
Bank reform 12,958 2.85 0.45 1.00 4.00
Vienna initiative dummy 13,027 0.06 0.24 0.00 1.00
Macro/country-specific indicators
Inflation 12,877 8.39 5.35 −2.41 59.22
M2 growth 13,020 0.22 0.17 −0.18 1.21
GDP growth 13,027 3.55 5.61 −17.95 34.50
Output gap 13,027 0.00 2.22E+10 −4.07E+10 5.21E+10
Trade to GDP 12,869 76.10 32.66 48.44 180.90
Total tax rate 12,999 47.80 12.45 8.20 137.30
General government final consumption expenditure 12,869 17.89 2.99 6.31 26.99
Population Density 13,027 42.63 43.36 1.65 165.99
US monetary policy 13,027 0.06 0.04 −0.03 0.12
Institutional indicators
Democratic accountability 12,089 3.49 1.51 1.00 6.00
Investor protection 12,173 8.99 1.24 5.50 11.50
Contract-intensive money 12,849 0.74 0.08 0.28 0.94
Government partisanship (left-wing) 13,027 0.15 0.36 0.00 1.00
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find that bank profitability in Switzerland is mainly explained by bank-specific factors
such as operational efficiency (positively) and the growth of total loans and funding
costs (negatively). Beltratti and Stulz (2012), incorporating measures of both bank-
specific and country-specific institutional and governance factors, also show that the
largest factors of profitability remained bank-specific, including total assets. In addi-
tion, Athanasoglou et al. (2008) find that capital adequacy and credit risk are also
important determinants of bank profitability (adequacy positively and credit risk
negatively), and these are also included as explanatory variables. Finally, given the
importance of foreign banks for developing the financial sector in transition, I include a
dummy for foreign ownership, justified by the empirical results from Claessens et al.
(2001). Table 3 shows a complete list of the various indicators utilized in the econo-
metric estimation and the provenance of the data.
Similarly, industry-specific, policy, and macroeconomic variables are taken from the
literature. In particular, prudent macroeconomic policies before the onset of the crisis
may have made the entire economy of a country more resilient to the exogenous
financial shock; as Flamini et al. (2009) show for banks in 41 countries in sub-
Saharan Africa, macroeconomic policies that promote low inflation and stable output
growth are good for the performance of banks in those countries. Thus, a country that
was well-prepared macroeconomically before the crisis may have been better-equipped
to deal with the crisis. To account for these macroeconomic policies that would
influence bank profitability, I include inflation, M2 growth, GDP growth, output gap,
taxation, government size, and trade ratio to GDP as part of the baseline specification.
In particular, inflation, M2 growth, taxation, the output gap, and government size
would signal macroeconomic distortions in an economy, proxying for policies that
promote instability and would be expected to have a negative effect on a bank’s balance
sheet. Similarly, GDP growth and trade ratios should be a signal of prudent macroeco-
nomic policies, including liberalization of the enterprise and trade sector, and should
positively impact bank profitability.
Additionally, some country-specific traits not included in any of these papers, but
that will be utilized in this model, are also included in this paper. For example,
population density is included as a determinant of profitability, the theory being that
a more dense population will have more need for financial intermediation than one that
is widely dispersed, thus increasing bank profitability. A case can also be made that
institutional attributes, being slow-formed and possibly slower-acting, would be less
consequential for the short-term balance sheets of banks in the region than swifter
macroeconomic adjustments taken globally. Indeed, while the crisis may have harmed
profitability in the short-run, the global response to the crisis may have provided quick
relief in the form of lower interest rates, ample liquidity, and sovereign and quasi-
sovereign guarantees (Btoo big to fail^) that would have bolstered bank profitability. To
capture this policy effect, a metric of the growth of M2 in the United States is included;
we should anticipate the quantitative easing of the US Federal Reserve to have large
positive effects on bank profitability in transition through a domino effect of increased
global liquidity.
The true innovation in this paper is not population density or the growth of M2 in the
US, however, but, as noted above, the inclusion of specific institutional variables to
capture institutional influence on profitability before and after the crisis. The two key
institutional variables utilized in the model are the International Country Risk Guide’s
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(ICRG) indicators for investor protection and democratic accountability, where investor
protection represents the legal framework for property rights (or, if you will, potential
property rights) and democratic accountability represents the ability of the individual
voter to influence the political system. The ICRG indicators are standard in the
literature for measuring institutional progress (see Djankov et al. 2006 or Akitoby
and Stratmann 2010), as they capture the legal and political environment governing
both property rights and the political system.
As a check on the subject investor protection ranking, I also utilize an objective
indicator for property rights, contract-intensive money, which represents the proportion
of money held inside the formal banking sector (see Clague et al. 1996 and Hartwell
2013). In contrast to the investor protection indicator, contract-intensive money is more
accurately described as realized property rights, as it measures the behavior of indi-
viduals in reaction to perceived changes in property rights. Of course, as with all
objective indicators, its drawback is that it may capture more than just property rights
(see Williams and Siddique 2008 for a critique of its use); however, when paired with
the ICRG indicator of investor protection, I believe it will deliver a full picture of both
ex ante and ex post property rights.
A further critique on the use of contract-intensive money is that it may appear odd to
use a banking indicator also an institutional indicator, but it can be justified due to its
particular attributes. In the first instance, as we are attempting to ascertain the profit-
ability of particular banks, as influenced by institutions, contract-intensive money is a
suitable proxy as no one bank influences the indicator; that is, while it functions as a
vote of confidence in the entire banking sector and property rights in general, unless
you are a country like Turkmenistan with a monobank structure, no single bank can
dominate the outcome of the indicator. Moreover, while contract-intensive money may
sometimes be thought of as a proxy for financial depth (Williams and Siddique 2008),
previous empirical tests by Clague et al. (1996) have shown that contract-intensive
money does indeed capture different effects than broader financial sector development.
This is indeed the case here for, as Table 4 shows, while there is some moderate
correlation between CIM and other financial depth variables (with the strongest being
with country-wide bank capital to assets ratio at 0.5094), the extent of the correlations
do not suggest that contract-intensive money cannot be used. Finally, and similarly,
econometrically, contract-intensive money shows almost zero collinearity with the bank
profitability variables or even the investor protection indicator (see Table 4), also
signaling its suitability in capturing property rights, rather than financial aspects.
3.2 Econometric Methodology
As our database is a classic short panel (small t, incredibly large n), the model utilized is
a (within group) fixed-effects estimator. The choice of a static fixed-effects approach is
conditioned on the dataset, as results of a Hausman test on the full model yielded results
that conclusively rejected a random-effects estimator. Moreover, given the importance
of each individual year in this sample, and given that this examination covers pre-crisis,
crisis, and post-crisis years, I have included period-specific fixed effects as well, a
technique confirmed via a Wald test. A modified Wald test for groupwise
heteroskedasticity likewise confirmed that our data is indeed heteroskedastic, and thus













































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Although these standard errors are robust to serial correlation, tests on the full model
yielded little evidence of serial correlation over this short time span (with a Wooldridge
test for autocorrelation yielding an F-stat of 0.238 with a probability of 0.6255 for ROA
and 0.426 for ROE, failing to reject the null of no first-order autocorrelation).2
Moreover, as noted above, given the large number of possible variables and the
reality of model uncertainty, Bayesian model averaging (BMA) in line with Hoeting
et al. (1999) and O’Hara and Sillanpää (2009) will be utilized to narrow down the
thousands of possible model combinations into more Bcorrect^ specifications for
examining bank profitability. As Fernandez et al. (2001:566) noted, BMA provides a
Bpractical and theoretically sound method for inference,^ while Hoeting et al.
(1999:398) correctly note that BIn theory, BMA provides better average predictive
performance than any single model that could be selected, and this theoretical result has
now been supported in practice in a range of applications involving different model
classes and types of data.^ The BMA model utilized in this paper is based upon the
priors and sampling mechanism of Magnus et al. (2010); such an approach assumes a
base model of:
y ¼ Wβ þ Zδ þ v ð2Þ
Which incorporates a classical Gaussian linear model, non-informative priors for the
β coefficient (as well as the error variance v), and a multivariate Gaussian prior for δ
(Dardanoni et al. 2012). The use of BMAwill thus help to consolidate our broad range
of explanatory variables to a more parsimonious set.
While this approach covers conditional heteroskedasticity of unknown form and
possible serial correlation, the fixed-effects approach does not eliminate the possibility
of endogeneity, an issue that is omnipresent in the consideration of institutions
(Przeworski 2004; Eicher and Leukert 2009; Hartwell 2013) as well as in bank
decisions regarding capital adequacy (Athanasoglou et al. 2008). Given this possible
endogeneity of some of our variables, an IV-GMM regression will be utilized for
robustness, with the institutional indicators instrumented by appropriate macro-
economic and country-specific indicators as derived from the literature and described
in more detail below. Standard econometric tests for instrument suitability will be
performed, but this IV-GMM approach will allow us to correct for unobserved fixed-
effects, heteroskedasticity, serial correlation, and endogeneity.
4 Results and Discussion
4.1 Baseline Specifications
To correct for model uncertainty, a BMA approach is utilized to derive a parsimonious
model from the full set of possible variables. Keeping the institutional indicators as the
2 Although Dietrich and Wanzenried (2011) correctly note the persistence of bank profits (thus arguing for a
system-GMM approach in their paper), this persistence, as just noted, is not present in my data. In particular,
the relatively short time frame, coupled with the straddling of a major financial crisis, means that the ROA
indicator utilized here exhibits little serial correlation, as well as arguing against a dynamic specification such
as system-GMM.
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focus parameters for the analysis, Bayesian averaging was conducted first on all
regressors (focus and auxiliary) over a space of 2,097,152 possible models
(1,048,576 possible models for each of the ROA and ROE specifications). The criterion
for determining robust correlation with the outcome variable for the auxiliary regressors
was suggested by De Luca and Magnus (2011), and involves retaining auxiliary
variables which have an absolute value of t-ratios over 1 (which also satisfies the
criteria that their two standard error confidence intervals do not include zero). This
approach avoids the ad hoc rule of thumb of Kass and Wasserman (1995), which
removes Bweak^ variables (i.e. those with a posterior inclusion probability of 0.5–0.75,
see Eicher et al. 2011), but has less predictive power than the Bmedian^ model used by
De Luca and Magnus (2011).
The results for the Bayesian averaging exercise are shown in Table 5 for both ROA
and ROE as a dependent variable. Using this guideline, we turn to the baseline fixed-
effects model for ROA shown in Table 6, with clustering on the bank and country
variables. As with earlier work, bank-specific attributes appear to be important, with
operating costs having the largest significance economically and statistically.
Institutional variables appear to dominate the regression, however, with every addi-
tional point of ICRG’s investor protection scale in a country leading to an increase of
Table 5 Bayesian model averaging results, fixed-effects specification
ROA ROE
Variable t pip Variable t pip
Constant 8.43 1.00 Constant −0.83 1.00 Focus variables
Contract-intensive money −0.59 1.00 Contract-intensive money −0.22 1.00
Investor Protection 2.71 1.00 Investor Protection 4.13 1.00
Democratic Accountability 5.05 1.00 Democratic Accountability 1.28 1.00
Size −9.27 0.66 Size −0.05 0.01 Auxiliary variables
Operating Costs −31.00 1.00 Operating Costs −25.17 1.00
Foreign Ownership 0.29 0.09 Foreign Ownership 0.00 0.01
Credit Risk −7.03 1.00 Credit Risk 0.14 0.03
Domestic Credit −0.88 0.49 Domestic Credit −4.32 1.00
Bank Concentration 0.11 0.03 Bank Concentration 0.44 0.19
Bank Reform 0.21 0.06 Bank Reform 1.13 0.62
Inflation −1.29 0.71 Inflation −0.02 0.02
M2 Growth −0.09 0.02 M2 Growth 0.03 0.01
GDP Growth 2.81 0.94 GDP Growth 2.05 0.84
Output Gap 0.05 0.02 Output Gap −0.07 0.02
Trade to GDP −0.27 0.09 Trade to GDP −0.16 0.04
Total Tax Rate 0.04 0.02 Total Tax Rate −0.18 0.05
Government Size 0.70 0.38 Government Size 4.14 1.00
Population Density 0.04 0.02 Population Density −0.77 0.45
US Monetary Policy 0.32 0.12 US Monetary Policy 1.76 0.82
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nearly a third of a percentage point of a bank’s return on assets. A perhaps more
puzzling result is that democratic accountability appears to be a negative (albeit less
significant) influence on bank profitability, one that almost perfectly counterbalances
the positive effects of investor protection. Indeed, this result holds even though the
country-specific attributes of Russia (whose banks are disproportionately represented in
the dataset) are controlled for by the fixed-effects specification. In regards to return on
assets, it appears that having a more engaged polity in the midst of a crisis is a bad
situation for a bank, even if the economy itself is growing, but property rights are
crucial for bringing banks back to profitability.
As noted earlier, an alternate proxy for bank profitability could be ROE,
which has been utilized in papers such as Guru et al. (2002) and Athanasoglou
et al. (2008). While perhaps imperfect when compared to ROA, due to the bias
in ROE understating the dangers of leverage, it provides a different measure of
bank profitability for robustness. The BMA analysis for ROE, already shown in
Table 5, holds some interesting results. There are important differences from the
ROA model, with policy variables holding much more of an importance in the ROE
analysis and bank-specific attributes are almost entirely insignificant. Finally, one
similarity between the two metrics, however (not shown here), was an almost perfect
insignificance of the year dummies across the entire model space, with no one year
scoring a PIP above 10 %.
The BMA fixed-effects regression for the ROE model is shown in Column 2
of Table 6, where US monetary policy and GDP growth in particular seem to
dominate, with only operating costs remain as a significant bank-specific trait.
More importantly, for our variables of interest, investor protection remains a
significant and positive explanator of bank profitability, with every step up
ICRG’s ladder leading to an additional 4 % of return for a particular bank.
Perhaps paradoxically, broader property rights have a surprisingly negative
effect on returns on equity, with each additional percentage of money held
inside banks leading to an 18 % decline in ROE. Indeed, on the whole, ROE appears to
be driven by outcomes external to the specific bank during the crisis period, with US
monetary policy increasing the returns and broader property rights dampening the return
of any one bank.
These results cover both the crisis and post-crisis periods, but an interesting
research question is whether or not institutions had a different effect during the
global financial crisis, as opposed to after it. To answer this question, I separate
both the ROA and ROE samples in two, one crisis period (2006–2009) and one
post-crisis (2010–2012), which results in a fairly even split of the full sample.
The effects by period are shown in Columns 3 and 4 for ROA and Columns 5
and 6 for ROE, and there are differences that stand out immediately. In the first
instance, investor protection appeared to be most important institution for bank
profitability during the crisis, tapering in terms of importance after the crisis.
Indeed, for every point of investor protection during the crisis years, banks saw an average
of 16.5 % more return on equity, while this effect dropped to a mere (and statistically
insignificant) 1.5 % in the post-crisis period. By contrast, democratic accountability was
not important in either sub-period, and overall property rights were important only post-
crisis (and only then marginally) for return on assets. Of the bank-specific attributes,
operating costs weighed heavily on profitability throughout the crisis and beyond. Perhaps
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most intriguingly, US monetary policy was a boon to bank return on equity during the
crisis period, but a hindrance (albeit insignificant) in the post-crisis era.
Table 6 Fixed-effects regression results, ROA and ROE as a function of institutions
Dependent variable
ROA ROE ROA ROE
Full sample Full sample Crisis Post-crisis Crisis Post-crisis
1 2 3 4 5 6
Institutional indicators
Democratic Accountability −0.34 −4.36 −0.66 −0.23 5.09 −16.13
1.92* 3.87** 1.39 0.63 1.14 1.23
Investor Protection 0.31 4.04 0.87 0.07 16.23 1.50
2.99** 4.42** 2.59** 0.52 2.86** 1.00
Contract-intensive money −0.20 −18.24 −4.58 3.13 44.22 6.61
0.12 2.01* 1.09 1.64* 0.91 0.18
Bank specific
Size 0.07 0.31 0.20
0.67 1.47 0.84
Operating costs −0.04 −0.29 −0.04 −0.06 −0.23 −0.40
5.61** 6.11** 3.50** 2.73** 3.33** 4.52**
Credit risk 0.01 0.03 0.01
1.75* 1.58 0.97
Industry-specific
Domestic credit −0.13 −0.22 0.01
1.61 1.34 0.01
Bank reform 1.13 −4.63 −17.52
0.22 0.43 0.80
Macro/country-specific indicators
Inflation −0.03 −0.04 −0.05
1.67* 1.21 2.55**
GDP Growth 0.05 0.63 0.07 −0.01 0.03 −0.61
5.80** 3.75** 5.49** 0.10 0.07 0.53
Government size 1.42 −0.12 1.95
2.47* 0.09 2.39*
US monetary policy 26.30 176.38 −54.51
3.13** 3.57** 0.66
C 1.46 −5.04 −2.57 0.95 −164.11 86.65
0.66 0.35 0.39 0.20 2.31* 1.17
n 9097 9065 4882 4215 4930 4135
Adjusted R-squared 0.32 0.26 0.34 0.37 0.18 0.51
Absolute value of t-stats shown underneath coefficients; * denotes significance at the 10 % level and ** at the
1 % level. Fixed effects specification with clustering on country and bank variables
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4.2 Robustness Tests
Given these sometimes paradoxical results, a series of robustness tests are called for. In
particular, the erratic behavior of democratic accountability in the baseline regressions
is puzzling: while democracy appears to be a positive influence for ROE during a crisis
period (Table 6, Column 5), for every other specification it is negative. It is possible
that what matters for the banking environment is not necessarily the ability of the
populace to influence the political process, but how they do it, that is, what sorts of
leaders they elect. Calderon and Schaeck (2013) note that left-wing governments are
more likely to intervene (i.e. bailout) banks in order to maintain employment, while
right-wing governments should, in theory, be more laissez-faire. However, such a
relationship is ambiguous in transition, as the linkages between both sides of the
ideological spectrum and the banking sectors in many transition countries (Jackowicz
et al. 2013) makes the influence of orientation on profitability more difficult to
ascertain.
To control for the partisan effects on bank performance in a democracy, in Table 7 I
include a dummy variable if the leader of a country is left-wing (Social Democrat or
Communist) or not, taking a value of 1 if the country’s leader or his or her
party has an explicit left-wing ideology, with a value of 0 if the leader/party is
right-wing or centrist. 3 Results of this further robustness test are shown in
Columns 1–4 of Table 7. In relation to ROA (Column 1), the presence of a
left-wing government per se is insignificant, while the negative of influence of
democracy persists. For ROE (Column 3), the left-wing government shows a
negative but marginally significant influence, while once again democracy
appears to be bad for return on equity. Perhaps this effect is a multiplicative
one, however, and so in Columns 2 and 4 I interact the left-wing dummy with
the democracy indicator, on the theory that left-wing populists might be more likely to
crack-down on bank profitability than leaders who are fairly well-insulated from the
political process (even if they are left-wing). This approach also yields interesting
results; for ROA, the interaction term just misses significance, while the presence of a
left-wing government and democracy are bad for bank profitability in transition. By
contrast, left-wing governments and democracy are strongly and unequivocally bad for
bank profits as measured by ROE, but the interaction term is positive.
Finally, perhaps it is not the type of leader in a democracy that affects bank
profitability, but the lobbying power of a few well-connected banks. Rajan and
Zingales (2003) note that democracy enables interest groups to influence the path of
financial sector development, creating barriers to entry in order to preserve the monop-
oly status of already-existing banks. This could lead to lower bank profitability on
average, even as it privileges a select few. To test this, I include the measure of bank
concentration interacted with democracy in Columns 5 and 6 of Table 7. As predicted,
for ROA concentration itself shows a moderate increase in bank profitability, but the
congruence of democracy and concentration leads to lower profitability on average.
Similarly, for ROE, the same effect is seen but is statistically insignificant. In either
3 Coding was done manually and based on the explicit party platform or stated affiliation of the country’s
leader.
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case, democratic accountability in and of itself has a mildly positive but insignificant
effect on bank profitability.
Beyond the influence of democracy, there may be other peculiarities of the crisis era
that may have influenced the performance of banks. One of the largest (and transition-
specific) factors possibly omitted from this previously model is the so-called BVienna
Initiative,^ a grouping of multilateral banks and the largest bank firms active in Central,
Eastern, and Southeastern Europe (CESEE) convened in January 2009 to ensure
continued cross-border flows to the region. In the first round, dubbed BVienna 1.0,^
five countries in particular were targeted for assistance (Bosnia and Herzegovina,
Hungary, Latvia, Romania, and Serbia) due to the perception that these countries would
be most affected by a general halt in cross-border bank flows. As the key objective of
Vienna 1.0 was to keep money flowing to foreign-owned subsidiaries in Central and
Eastern Europe, this intervention could have had an effect on the balance sheets of
banks that was unrelated to other macroeconomic, institutional, or other country-
specific attributes.
To account for this reality, I include a dummy for banks based in these five countries
from the period of 2008 onward for both the ROA and the ROE regressions. With the
inclusion of a further variable, the BMA analysis is re-run as well, leading to the pared-
down specification shown in Columns 7 and 8 of Table 7. For the most part, in regards
to ROA, the results are unchanged, with democratic accountability losing a bit of its
significance and investor protection gaining more, but the scale is roughly equivalent.
On the other hand, the inclusion of the Vienna Initiative dummy creates large changes
in the behavior of institutions to ROE; while (as in the ROA analysis) the Vienna
dummy itself is insignificant, the sign and magnitude of democratic accountability
changes appreciably. Once a mildly positive influence, democracy is now a strongly
and significantly negative predictor of bank profitability. Bank-specific traits, absent
from the earlier BMA exercise, re-enter the ROE equation, with operating costs
negatively influencing profitability, at least on equity.
In a similar vein as the Vienna Initiative, perhaps the type of ownership of a bank
(foreign versus domestic) would have differential impacts on a bank’s profitability.4 To
test this, in Table 8 I re-run the baseline regressions for ROA and ROE on two separate
samples, one of foreign-owned and one of domestically-owned banks, and the results
provide an interesting glimpse of the quite divergent influence of various institutions
depending upon type of bank ownership. In the ROA regressions (the first two
columns), country-level institutions have little impact for foreign bank profitability,
but investor protection is critical for domestic banks and democratic accountability has
a strong negative effect on profitability. On the other hand, for ROE (the third and
fourth columns), democracy and enforced property rights are bad for domestic banks,
while they have little impact on foreign-owned banks (the importance of a good
legislative framework for investors is consistent across both types of financial
institutions).
These results contradict Qian and Strahan’s (2007) assertion that foreign banks are
more sensitive to the legal and institutional environment, in that domestic banks seem
to be more affected by democracy and realized property rights. Indeed, the disparate
4 Even though the ownership dummy was insignificant in the BMA analysis, splitting the sample can yield
evidence of different in-group dynamics. Thanks to an anonymous referee for pointing out this possibility.
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Table 7 Robustness tests, fixed-effects specification
Dependent variable
ROA ROA ROE ROE ROA ROE ROA ROE
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Institutional indicators
Democratic accountability −0.33 −0.38 −4.24 −5.74 0.48 4.33 −0.33 −4.33
1.90* 2.13* 3.79** 5.00** 1.03 1.09 1.88* 3.57**
Investor protection 0.34 0.32 4.57 4.39 0.49 8.71 0.29 4.02
2.93** 2.72** 4.56** 4.40** 2.38* 4.37** 2.62** 4.17**
Contract-intensive money −0.37 −0.53 −21.32 −25.16 −1.14 26.26 −0.02 −18.10
0.22 0.33 2.31* 2.81** 0.40 1.28 0.01 2.02*
Left-wing government −0.25 −2.99 −4.91 −76.25
0.86 0.89 2.24* 4.07**
Left-wing*democracy 0.50 12.84
0.83 3.84**
Democracy*bank concentration −0.02 −0.10
1.99* 1.13
Bank specific
Size 0.07 0.07 0.08 0.07
0.67 0.59 0.62 0.66
Operating Costs −0.04 −0.04 −0.29 −0.30 −0.04 −0.29 −0.04 −0.29
5.63** 5.64** 6.09** 6.21** 5.65** 5.08** 5.58** 6.05**
Credit risk −0.01 −0.01 0.01 0.01
1.75* 1.68* 1.92* 1.78*
Industry-specific
Domestic credit −0.12 −0.21 −0.15 −0.13
1.56 2.59** 1.46 1.52
Bank Concentration 0.10 0.44
2.32* 1.02
Bank Reform 0.75 −0.75 −6.65 1.17
0.14 0.14 0.98 0.22
Macro/country-specific indicators
Inflation −0.02 −0.02 −0.05 −0.03
1.66* 1.54 2.25* 1.69*
M2 growth
GDP growth 0.05 0.05 0.66 0.63 0.06 0.66 0.05 0.63
5.87** 5.90** 3.89** 3.75** 6.22** 3.24** 5.53** 3.57**
Government size 1.54 1.52 1.45 1.41
2.67** 2.64** 2.10* 2.32*
US Monetary Policy 28.26 25.95 35.34 26.14
3.37** 3.03** 3.97** 3.27**
Vienna initiative dummy −0.32 −0.34
0.83 0.10
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impact of democracy by ownership type shown in these regressions could be what is
driving the negative correlation between democracy and profitability in the larger
sample. These results may also suggest a plausible theoretical explanation for the
negative relationship seen to this point: simply put, foreign-owned banks may be less
subject to populist legislation than domestic banks, being able to leave a certain market
if things become too difficult. Domestic banks do not have this luxury, and thus a more
democratic polity inclined towards policies deleterious to banks would logically harm
them disproportionately.
Lastly, as noted above, endogeneity is a common problem in institutional regres-
sions (Eicher and Leukert 2009) and especially in a transition context (Hartwell 2013);
moreover, it is possible that various facets of bank performance themselves are
endogenous based on the broader institutional environment (Athanasoglou et al.
2008). To cope with this issue, an IV-GMM specification was utilized that instrumented
one bank-specific attribute (capital adequacy) and the three institutional variables
(investor protection, democratic accountability, and contract-intensive money).
Capital adequacy was omitted from earlier regressions due to worries about its
endogeneity (Athanasoglou et al. 2008), but a new BMA analysis yields evidence of
its importance: Table 9 reports the results of the BMA testing of 4,194,304 models
(2,097,152 models a piece for ROA and ROE), with equity to total assets showing a
robust correlation with ROA and ROE.
More importantly for our purposes is the possible endogeneity of institutions over
this shorter time period. The fact that institutional change did in fact occur during the
global financial crisis could be attributed to exogenous factors, in that institutional
change was merely continuing the process of transition begun up to 25 years earlier.
However, it is also plausible that the prevailing macroeconomic and financial condi-
tions during this period could have effected institutional change, as well as the previous
path that a country’s institutional system was on. To correct for this possible
endogeneity, in both the ROA and ROE regressions I utilize the one-year lag of the
institutional variable as an instrument for that specific institution.
As this instrumentation strategy would result in an exactly specified equation, as
well as likely miss the other variables influencing institutional change, I also bring in
two additional instruments in the ROA regression: bank liberalization, on the assump-
tion that a country’s level of financial reform could influence both the development of
Table 7 (continued)
Dependent variable
ROA ROA ROE ROE ROA ROE ROA ROE
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
C 1.37 1.97 −9.02 11.38 −3.50 −91.23 1.49 −5.02
0.62 0.85 0.62 0.78 0.83 2.70** 0.67 0.35
n 9097 9097 9065 9065 7653 7723 9097 9065
Adjusted R-squared 0.32 0.32 0.26 0.26 0.34 0.26 0.32 0.26
Absolute value of t-stats shown underneath coefficients; * denotes significance at the 10 % level and ** at the
1 % level. Fixed effects specification with clustering on country and bank variables
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property rights and levels of democracy (see Hartwell 2014), and the level of domestic
credit, on the basis that credit availability would influence the size of the financial
sector (as well as the private sector), altering the calculus for institutional reform in a
crisis situation. In regards to the ROE regression, bank liberalization is also included, as
is the lag of capital adequacy (which may be more relevant in the ROE model for
Table 8 Fixed-effects regressions by type of ownership
ROA ROE
Foreign Domestic Foreign Domestic
Institutional indicators
Democratic accountability −0.08 −0.61 −2.86 −3.51
0.19 2.91** 1.10 3.13**
Investor protection 0.15 0.44 4.27 3.09
0.89 3.37** 3.22** 3.00**
Contract-intensive money 3.90 −1.55 21.64 −26.39




Operating costs −0.03 −0.06 −0.35 −0.25
3.57** 5.56** 4.82** 4.80**
Credit risk 0.03 0.01
2.76** 1.04
Industry-specific
Domestic credit −0.17 −0.09
1.31 0.89





GDP Growth 0.12 0.03 1.17 0.41
5.60** 2.86** 2.25* 3.32**
Government Size 1.64 0.80
1.65* 1.53
US monetary policy 13.03 27.31
0.44 3.49**
C −5.34 4.60 −32.06 −3.24
1.28 1.93* 0.96 0.22
n 2084 7013 2066 6999
Adjusted R-squared 0.36 0.32 0.29 0.21
Absolute value of t-stats shown underneath coefficients; * denotes significance at the 10 % level and ** at the
1 % level. Fixed effects specification with clustering on country and bank variables
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determining the current level of capital adequacy).5 Finally, government growth is also
included in the ROE model on the basis that changes in government during the global
financial crisis could have had an impact on democracy and property rights; rather,
growth of government in previous periods could have been a signal for the diminution
of investor protection in later periods, and perhaps a lessening of democracy as well.
Government growth may also have had an impact on capital adequacy decisions by
banks, as larger governments may be able to require more capital from banks (similar to
Agoraki et al.’s (2011) instrument strategy).
Correcting for the reality of endogeneity, the IV-GMM fixed-effects regression is
shown in Table 10. In Column 1, using the instruments detailed above for ROA,
investor protection remains the largest positive institutional determinant of bank prof-
itability, with every move towards greater investor protection resulting in approximate-
ly half a percentage point increase in ROA. Perhaps somewhat reassuringly, the issue of
democratic accountability disappears, as democracy enters as positive and marginally
5 The lag of capital adequacy was not utilized in the ROA regression as diagnostics revealed it to be highly
unsuitable as an instrument. As one example, the inclusion of the lag of capital adequacy reduced the p-value
of the Hansen J-statistic to 0.000 from the level seen in the IV-GMM regression shown in Table 10, Column 1.
Table 9 Bayesian model averaging results including capital adequacy
ROA ROE
Variable t pip Variable t pip
Constant 4.03 1.00 Constant 0.07 1.00 Focus variables
Contract-intensive money −1.57 1.00 Contract-intensive money −0.08 1.00
Investor protection 3.82 1.00 Investor Protection 3.68 1.00
Democratic accountability −3.43 1.00 Democratic Accountability −1.38 1.00
Size −1.23 0.66 Size 0.34 0.44 Auxiliary variables
Operating costs −28.33 1.00 Operating Costs −23.75 1.00
Foreign ownership 0.17 0.04 Foreign Ownership 0.00 0.01
Credit risk −3.9 0.99 Credit Risk 0.14 0.02
Capital adequacy 12.31 1.00 Capital Adequacy −4.58 1.00
Domestic credit −0.55 0.27 Domestic Credit −4.51 1.00
Bank concentration 0.11 0.04 Bank Concentration 0.24 0.03
Bank reform 0.12 0.03 Bank Reform 1.27 0.68
Inflation −0.92 0.52 Inflation −0.02 0.02
M2 growth −0.11 0.02 M2 Growth 0.04 0.01
GDP growth 3.98 0.97 GDP Growth 0.86 0.18
Output gap 0.1 0.02 Output Gap −0.07 0.03
Trade to GDP −0.57 0.30 Trade to GDP −0.14 0.04
Total tax rate 0.16 0.04 Total Tax Rate −0.3 0.10
Government size 0.92 0.51 Government Size 3.76 1.00
Population density 0.07 0.02 Population Density −0.92 0.55
US monetary policy 0.44 0.19 US Monetary Policy 1.48 0.75
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Democratic accountability 0.25 −1.47
1.89* 1.02
Investor protection 0.53 1.83
5.20** 2.76**







Operating costs −0.04 −0.23
9.52** 7.62**

















Kleibergen-Papp underidentification (p) 0.0000 0.0000
Hansen J statistic (p) 0.7904 0.8071
C-statistic for exogeneity of instrument (p) 0.4964 0.8221
Endogeneity test (p) 0.0000 0.0592













Absolute value of t-stats shown underneath coefficients; * denotes significance at the 10 % level and ** at the
1 % level. Two-step regressions with robust standard errors
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significant, perhaps suggesting that the real channel political institutions work
through is via regulations on banks.6 Column 2 repeats the analysis for ROE,
and the results confirm that democracy is indeed (at least in the crisis period)
bad for a bank’s return on equity, although it is also insignificant; more
importantly, the presence of a left-wing government is highly and negatively significant,
suggesting that the election of a left-wing government reduced bank profitability by as
much as 7 % of its ROE.
These results are bolstered by the first-stage regressions and post-estimation
tests confirming the strength and exogeneity of instruments. In each regression,
as shown in Table 10, the Kleibergen-Paap under-identification tests are con-
clusively rejected, while the Hansen J-statistic shows a comfortable acceptance
of the null of validity of the instruments. Moreover, both the C-statistic
exogeneity test of the instruments and the testing of the joint endogeneity of
the regressors (implemented as a difference in Sargan-Hansen statistics tests)
shows that the instruments are safely exogenous while the suspect variables
exhibit endogeneity. Finally, results from the first-stage regressions support the
choice of instruments: for both regressions, the Anderson-Rubin Wald test and
the Stock-Wright LMS-statistic for weak instruments show a p-value of 0.000, while the
individual F-tests on each endogenous regressor also conclusively rejects the null of
weak instrumentation (with F-statistic ranging from 66 for capital adequacy to over
15,000 for democracy). Thus, we can safely conclude that our instruments pass all
econometric tests for relevance and exogeneity.
5 Conclusions
This paper has taken a new look at the drivers of bank profitability in
transition, focusing on the role of institutions during the global financial crisis.
The results over the various specifications suggest that bank-specific attributes
remain important, but that institutional factors appeared to be more important
than country-specific policies for explaining bank performance. Investor protection, in
particular, was a positive explanator of bank profitability for both ROA and
ROE across all specifications, an effect that was most pronounced during the global
financial crisis. Overall democratic accountability, on the other hand, appeared
to be an overall hindrance to profitability, although this effect vanished when
controlling for bank concentration. Further analysis revealed that the presence
of a left-wing government over the period of the global financial crisis hindered
return on equity. In any event, these effects were dwarfed by the impact of US
monetary policy during the crisis, suggesting that a bank’s ROE was dependent
not on bank-, industry-, or country-specific attributes, but by policies undertaken
thousands of miles away.
The implications of this analysis are both simple and complex: in the first
instance, any strengthening of property rights specifically concerned with in-
vestor protection is good for the economy in general and for bank profitability
specifically, and thus banks should be in favor of such policies. This is the
6 This supposition is not tested here but is a topic for future research.
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simple implication. The more complex part comes in relation to the political
institutions, which show a clear negative effect for democracy and left-wing
governments on bank profitability. In such an environment, banks should
perhaps be prepared to move out of debt leverage and into other vehicles, in
order to maintain profitability. In either case, banks should look at cutting
operating costs and increasing capital adequacy to deal with the unexpected.
In particular, if bank profitability in a crisis is dependent upon forces beyond even national
policymakers’ controls (i.e. US monetary policy), a bank should deal with its own in-
house issues and lobby for better property rights rather than wait for the benevolence of
the Fed to save them.
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